Article

# "Livius Drusus and the Italian Question*"

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# *Livius Drusus and the Italian Question* *

The tribunate of Livius Drusus has come to be accepted as an isolated crux in historical scholarship — even relished as something of a notorious enigma. I am uneasily aware of Professor Badian's salutary complaint about "the reckless and the paradox mongers" who have tilted lances at this problem.[1] But as I survey the reckless many who have gone before, I really must award Carcopino the palm. Incoherence in the policies of Drusus, argued Carcopino, may be ascribed to that tribune's neurotic personality. Even Hugh Last attributed Drusus' failure, in part, to his arrogance and conscious superiority — as if such qualities were rare in Roman nobles![2]

I venture to reopen the question because I believe that it needs to be set in a far wider perspective: wider geographically as well as temporally. The traditional approach tends to treat Drusus' proposals like interlocking pieces of some brain-teasing puzzle for Senior Common Rooms and to isolate them from their social and economic setting. Most analyses focus narrowly on the judiciary law, tinkering away at the various legalistic reconstructions which the sources seem to support and using this as the centre-piece of a neatly self-contained puzzle. It is equally traditional to accept the perspective of the literary sources — centred upon courts and *curia*, setting political history within the frame of the capital, and hiving off provincial affairs as a distinct or ancillary study.[3]

Let us begin by despatching that tiresome Hamlet figure so prized by moralizing historians: Drusus cast as the idealistic lone champion, burning to implement some masterplan for Rome's salvation; ahead of his time, only pages away from Sulla, and so intent on stopping the fall of the Republic that he must have read R.E. Smith in a prognostic dream. This pervasive view gives us Drusus the disinterested 'social engineer', striving to reconcile by reciprocal concessions the elements of Roman society set at odds by the Gracchi.[4] Acceptance of Appian's Italy-centered perspective can produce a Drusus of heroic proportions, whose supreme goal was to head off the Social War, which somehow he alone foresaw, but who aimed too high over crass senatorial heads. Erich Gruen has condemned Appian's perspective as myopic, but this Drusus is still enshrined in Sherwin-White's *Roman Citizenship*, gloriously free from all taint of factional politics.[5]

We may first question the idea that Drusus was righting a manifest wrong in seeking to extend the franchise. Was this a 'right' unjustly withheld from the

Italians? Concepts of voting rights current in Western society provide a poor analogy here. Even the Greek systems of isopoliteia and sympoliteia, with a 'potential' citizenship among a group of cities to be actualized by domicile, provide no real precedent for the policy ultimately forced upon Rome by the Social War — that of issuing its exclusive citizenship to the members of a disparate treaty federation while keeping full political rights centered exclusively upon one, paramount city which kept city-state structure. If it was conceptually difficult for Romans to make their city-state coextensive with a racially and linguistically diverse peninsula, this step did not so obviously constitute reform in their eyes.[6]

To clear the path still further I will pause for a brief Gordian knot cutting ceremony and roundly declare that I follow Strachan-Davidson and Balsdon in holding that Drusus aimed to take the extortion court outright from the Equites and restore it to an unenlarged Senate. This view, unfashionable though it is, receives considerable corroboration from Cicero's emphatic characterization of Drusus as a firm champion of the Senate's traditional authority. Cicero's strongly-worded and well-informed eulogy makes it well nigh impossible for me to believe the alternate versions: that Drusus advocated flooding the Senate with three hundred Equites or leaving Equites with senators on a joint judicial panel. If Drusus could secure a vote of censure in the Senate on the consul Philippus in September of his year of office, Cicero's judgement cannot be far wrong.[7]

I therefore feel no qualms about exorcizing the phantom Drusus of the handbooks with his masterstroke of conciliatory reform. If his *lex iudiciaria* was an act of political war against the Equites, he emerges more realistically as a cut and thrust politician. We need not be branded as cynics if we look to the remainder of his program for a bid to win an overwhelming *clientela* among *plebs* and Italians and create a power-base for political battle. But in any case Drusus the isolated thinker, the martyred idealist who stood above factional power-politics, was always an incredible construct. We should have looked all along for a recognizable Roman *nobilis* operating by Roman values and manoeuvering with his confederates for the typical goals of his class. His unusually lavish aedileship in itself suggests a realistic grasp of the hold given by largesse over the affections of the electorate.[8] But if Drusus was no lone idealist, our correct line of approach will be to look more broadly at the fortunes and interests of his *factio* and to trace these in the pattern of a larger span of years.

The major names behind Drusus are well known. And they are powerful names indeed, too senior and hard-bitten by far to be cast as passive or unwitting supporters of an apolitical blueprint for social harmony devised by that young man. Notably M. Aemilius Scaurus, *princeps senatus,* centre of the Metellan *factio*, whose 'nod well-nigh ruled the world,' and whose indictment by Drusus' *inimicus* Q. Servilius Caepio must, as Asconius says, have been a major and immediate tactical reason for the Drusan legislation. The conviction in 92 B.C. of that martyr of the optimate annals and consular member of the Metellan *factio* Rutilius Rufus was seen as a major demonstration of the political power of the

Equestrian jurors. This immediate historical background in itself suggests that urgent priority would be given by the *factio* to an attack on Equestrian monopoly of the extortion court intended to end its use as a political weapon.[9]

If so, Drusus was a good choice. A powerful orator, his credit high with the people from his aedileship, he had the further advantage of personal contacts with Italian *domi nobiles* and may have retained some credit with the *Latini* from his father's platform of 122 B.C. It may even be that he hoped to adopt his father's successful tactic by wooing the *plebs* and appealing to the Latins in order to defeat Gracchan-style use of the Equites as a force against the *optimates*.[10] But a survey of the immediately preceding decades shows up the wider lines of political strategy. We may discern a judicial harassment of the central Metellan group, commencing in 111 B.C., through persistent allegations of corruption or blundering in the provinces: the charges seem calculated to disaffect the commercial Equites, the ever jingoist *plebs*, and possibly the legions. C. Memmius opened this intermittent campaign, challenging the traditional methods by which the *nobiles* controlled client princes as corrupt in dealings with Jugurtha. The *quaestio Mamilia* followed in 109 B.C., making political capital out of another charge of corrupt secret dealing with Jugurtha and convicting four consulars. The weapon of show-trials before Equestrian *iudices* had now been forged and tested, and the *nobiles* could be effectively harried by challenges to their control of provincial affairs. The Marian humiliation of Metellus by the popularly voted command of 107 B.C. showed the profits to be realized. The Senate's counter-offensive predictably concentrated on jury compositon. Hence the *lex Servilia Caepionis* of 106 B.C. and the success of the popular Crassus in regaining the support of the *plebs*. But 104 B.C. saw the renewed assault of the *lex Servilia Glauciae* which capitalized once again on scandals over corruption and incompetence in the field and harnessed the mood of anger against the *nobiles* over Caepio's fiasco at Arausio and the evanescent gold of Tolosa.[11] The extortion court had become the decisive weapon in the struggle for control of provincial affairs. 103 B.C. saw the trials of Caepio and Mallius and the refinement of the technique by the *lex Appuleia de maiestate* which set up in permanent commission the type of *quaestio* established by Mamilius.[12]

The thrust of this attack was the denunciation as corrupt or ineffectual of the traditional personal diplomacy employed by the *nobiles* in dealing with client kings: personal interviews with *patroni*, exchanges of gifts and the like. It was an effective means of rousing the Equites to indignation over lack of safeguards for their security in provincial enterprises — as at Cirta — but it could also make the *plebs* and possibly the army resentful at the squandering of Roman prestige. The stakes were high. Marius successfully appealed for Equestrian support by the promise of a quick end to a war ruinous to trade and the restoration of security, and won his command by plebiscite to the chagrin of the Metelli. It was a durable technique, to be repeated in 66 B.C. for Pompey's benefit with Lucullus as the loser. But it is easy to overlook the likelihood that Italian *negotiatores*, and possibly Italian soldiers, would be equally susceptible to such emotive criticism of the Roman nobility and that their resentment might take a form which offered no capital for Roman politicians.[13]

I contend that we should continue to look out to the provinces and not confine political history to Rome-centered issues. How enlightening it has proved to view the Gracchan legislation against the background of the Sicilian slave war and the long agony of the Spanish reconquest; to link the Gracchan definition of the Equestrian class with the scramble to stake out interests in the Attalid bequest, to view Catiline in the light of Pompey's imminent return from the East and of the financial crisis triggered in Italy by massive recall of capital for eastern investment.[14] To set Drusus also in correct perspective we must see how his plans relate to Asia. For Asia was indeed, to borrow Reinach's apt phrase, "la vache à lait de la république," milch-cow of the Republic, yielding its rich streams to *publicani, negotiatores* great and small, senatorial officialdom, and all who stood in line to milk it. Tacitus, who should know, tartly calls it 'dives ac parata peccantibus.' The effects of the scramble for its wealth upon Roman politics merit full attention.[15] Asia had had an immediate impact: the plan of the elder Gracchus to lubricate his land commission with the royal treasury was made the more attractive by inherited *patronatus* with the Attalids, while the younger Gracchus was to adjust the Asian tax system with an eye to Equestrian support and attract Asian envoys to Rome to canvass for his judiciary bill.[16] The publicans' overbid for the Asian taxes in 61 B.C. demonstrated both the huge expectations of the business world and the furore which these could raise in interraction with the politics of the capital.[17] Sulla's coup of 88 B.C. most strikingly links Roman politics with the scramble for the East and indicates that we can hardly exaggerate the importance of Asia. The first army to march on Rome does so to recover the Asian command for its general; the powers of the tribunate and the tribal registration of the *Italici* are subverted because of an army avid for the loot of Asia and fearful that Marius would raise a different force to take east.[18]

Among the contentious issues of the 90's were the techniques of control over this wealthiest area of the Roman world and the more immediate prospect of a scramble for a major command against Mithridates. The lesson of 107 B.C. and the effective power of Equestrian indignation will not have been forgotten, and it cannot be coincidence that the Metellan *factio* was now under attack in the *repetundae* court in the person of its senior members — and always in connection with Asia. Drusus, having served his own quaestorship in Asia, would appreciate the importance of controlling this area, and I submit that we ignore a major issue of the day if we confine our analysis to squabbles in Rome or even to discontent within the Italian peninsula.[19]

Concern of the ruling *factio* for Asia is clear enough, and one may discern significant parallels between the situation in Asia and that in Africa before the intervention of the popularist tribunes. In Asia, as previously in Numidia, the nobles seem not to have been planning any major war if this could be avoided by traditional diplomatic techniques. They watched the movements of Mithridates and Nicomedes, despatched *legati*, and issued orders appropriate to client princes, but avoided military commitment as far as possible. Significantly, Rome kept no standing army in Asia until 84 B.C. and relied at need on local

levies. One suspects that she increasingly appeared a 'paper tiger' to ambitious eastern kings since in dealings with them up until 88 B.C. she was still trading heavily on the reputation won with the defeat of Antiochus Megas.[20]

This senatorial policy left openings for the very same allegations which were made to such effect in Numidia after 111 B.C. and the same political prizes were in prospect. Here again, if the Marian group could discredit diplomatic handling of refractory clients as corrupt and ineffectual, they might hope to force a military solution which required an expeditionary force and so create a plum Asian command. For Jugurtha, read the more gilded Mithridates. The same Scaurus, who had exerted all his prestigious wiles to effect a settlement with Jugurtha, was sent out in 97 B.C. to restore the status quo by ordering Nicomedes and Mithridates to evacuate Paphlagonia and Cappadocia. Marius' grand tour of inspection, undertaken late in 99 B.C., may well have set off alarm bells in Scaurus' headquarters.[21] Scaurus' diplomatic effectiveness was to be challenged five years later by the tried and tested technique of a charge of corruption. The charge, bribery by Mithridates himself, was boldly chosen and recalls the Numidian pattern.[22] Conviction would pillory the *nobiles* for selling out Rome's eastern interests in the person of their *princeps senatus,* and if Equestrian interests could be sufficiently alarmed over Roman security and prestige in the East, the courts could be relied upon to cooperate. Next came the special mission to Asia of Q. Mucius Scaevola in 94 B.C., in which Scaevola, aided by Rutilius Rufus, set himself to restore the goodwill and loyalty of the provincial cities by a reform of the administration which was carefully represented as a clean-up of the abuses of Equestrian interest-groups.[23]

The devastating riposte was the conviction of Rutilius himself for *repetundarum.* Demonstrating in an extreme form the political value of that *quaestio,* it more than undid the prestige won from Scaevola's tour of duty by a spectacular assertion that the expert adviser to the supposed reform was himself corrupt. Marius had wrecked the nobles' claim to be responsibly managing Asia and foiled their attempt to parade 94 B.C. as a long-term settlement of its tensions.[24] Such damage to the Senate's image would strengthen the hand of those who hoped for an end to traditional diplomacy in Anatolia and the reassertion of Roman prestige by an extraordinary command voted through the assembly. The culminating threat to the nobles' control over eastern policy was the indictment of Scaurus himself, senior statesman of a whole era of senatorial diplomacy. Again we find a shrewdly selected charge which recalls the pattern of 108 B.C.: Scaurus was alleged to be in the pocket of Mithridates. Corruption on such a scale would reinforce suspicions that the Senate was negligent in maintaining Roman prestige. The Senate had indeed seemed slow about bringing Mithridates to book for his foray into Paphlagonia, and this lack of a firm response had apparently emboldened the king to seize Cappadocia.[25] We may at least be sure that the slow, traditional diplomacy of *legationes* offered little scope to Caius Marius.

I hope that this review has shed some new light on Drusus' plan of action. It was to be a daring counter-offensive against Equestrian abuse of the extortion

court, drawing on Gracchan techniques to win back the *plebs* and even leap-frogging the *populares* to net a massive *clientela* by enfranchisement. The alternative would be to watch the conviction of Scaurus and risk a repetition of the disaster of 108 B.C. — discredited diplomatic measures brushed aside by a major command for the nobles' greatest *inimicus*. I am also emboldened to question whether it was mere coincidence that the triple crisis of Italian discontent, faltering Roman control in Anatolia and bitter friction between Senate and Equites came to a head at this particular time. Asia may again supply an answer. From Asia came unsettling rumours of war with Mithridates and after that a major reshuffle of the Roman settlement. Expectations were aroused of military operations in the East on the largest scale since 190 B.C. and of a correspondingly vast haul of loot. In prospect such a war, to use Appian's description, looked πολύΧρυσος indeed.[26] What better time for Marius and his supporters to inflame Equites and *plebs* over the ruling *factio*'s Asian record, to discredit by 'show' trials the diplomatic dealings which staved off major *imperia*, and to repeat, on a much grander scale, the triumph of 108 B.C.?

Events were to show that expectations of the looming war were not based on a realistic appraisal of Pontic military potential. Mithridates was rated on the power scale as yet another Hellenistic king, and ease of humbling him correspondingly exaggerated. But Rome was far less well-informed about Pontus than other Anatolian kingdoms, and its kings had shown correspondingly greater independence and initiative in developing their power unmonitored by Roman checks. In a sense, Mithridates had stepped into the shoes of Antiochus Megas and knew it.[27] His coin-portraiture, modelled after Alexander the Great, does not evince humility, and his slowness in meeting Roman ultimata over evacuations suggests that the prestige of Magnesia was wearing thin. The hauteur of Marius' famous challenge to the king indicates that he also underestimated him, and the price extorted from Sulpicius in the crisis of 88 B.C. puts it beyond doubt that Marius hankered after the eastern command. It has even been suggested, with some reason, that he took steps to goad Mithridates into defensive action which would provide the *casus belli*.[28]

Before drawing the Italian question more closely into this analysis, I pause for ruthless pruning of the emotionalism produced by modern concepts of 'rights' and 'enfranchisement.' Drusus does *not* set a heroic precedent for the British Labour Party's policy on India! I would be anachronistic to suppose that the Italians claimed any abstract 'right' to full citizenship in a national state. The Romans themselves did not define liberty in terms of ballot-casting or office-holding, and there was not, either ethnically or linguistically, an Italian state waiting to be born by legislative midwifery.[29] A pan-Italian state was an entity which Augustus would later begin to mould at a time when the actual power of voting assemblies and Senate was waning. And his state would be put together, not by apportioning civic rights, but by extra-legal forces such as the new Equestrian *cursus*, the army, the imperial cult, the new 'national' literature, and intermarriage between Roman and Italian gentry. Only a tiny percentage of the dissident Italians could have hoped to exercise voting-rights in Rome, still less to

attain office, and their localized civic loyalties still show up in the strong mutual animosities between Italian *municipia* which surfaced in the Civil War of 69 A.D. For Pliny, 'patria mea' was still Comum.[30] Moreover, in ancient terms the extension of a unitary and exclusive citizenship to a mosaic of towns and tribes, racially and linguistically disparate, was not an obvious 'right' neeeded to end some constitutional inequity. The resistance of the Roman ruling class to widespread enfranchisement need not be seen as mere self-regarding reaction.

Nor can we plausibly offer any unitary explanation of Italian grievances, especially as some of the Confederates, notably the Samnites, clearly fought for total national independence. Indeed, the Oscan bull who tramples the Roman wolf in the crude symbolism of their coins tempts one to believe that the Samnites may have yearned to press Samnite citizenship on their Roman masters![31] Simplistic solutions are to be avoided, but we need not exclude the consideration that the grievances of some Italians may have stemmed in part from Roman policy in the East. The classic attempt to establish such a connection with the provinces was made by Emilio Gabba. His thesis — that the Italian mercantile classes wanted a voice in Roman foreign policy plus seats in the Senate in order to further their economic interests and push for expansionist policies — has not found acceptance. In particular, it is objected that the core of the revolt lay with the Sabellian highlanders of central and southern Apennines, and that the leading commercial families from Campania and the south Italian seaports cannot be convincingly connected with the leadership of the Confederacy.[32] But Gabba's formulation of a possible connection between Italian disaffection and provincial affairs is not the only one to merit exploration. Of course, quite apart from any expansionist wishes, Italian *negotiatores* in the provinces would in normal conditions covet improved legal standing at the governor's tribunal and the right to sit on his *consilium*[33] Italian businessmen at home would welcome the right to compete in Rome for Asian tax-contracts. Italian soldiers abroad would be glad to exchange liability to rods and axes for the lesser — and lighter — *vitis*, and to have equal rights with Romans to pay-scales, shares in booty, and allotment schemes voted at Rome. But if a lucrative major war was thought to be in prospect in the late 90's, desire for a fairer share in the economic benefits of empire would intensify, and grievances, not necessarily connected with frustrated expansionism, would be sharpened. An expeditionary army for Asia would have to be raised in Italy, and Italians of all social levels who served *ex formula togatorum* would surely resent the prospect of smaller shares in the anticipated loot. The interest of the ordinary soldiers would be the greater if the *socii* had now followed the Roman lead and dropped the cansus requirement for service.[34]

It is, moreover, easy to overlook the vital point that the Italian peoples, whether their presence in Rome's provinces was military or mercantile, would be as susceptible as their Roman counterparts to Marian representation of the *nobiles* as corrupt bunglers who were mismanaging the Empire which they, the Italians had helped to conquer and in which they had so large a stake. Such contrived resentment would exacerbate long-standing irritation over the unequal standing of Italian troops, officers and merchants. As rumours of corruption in

Roman leadership filtered through Italy, various disparate sectors of Italian society would be susceptible to angry disillusion — not least the warlike peoples who fielded the armies of the Confederacy. Resentful mistrust of the Roman Senate's performance would mingle explosively with heightened expectations of operations in Asia. 'Pecunia non olet,' quipped Vespasian. Neither did avarice require Roman citizenship as its precondition. We see the conviction of Rutilius Rufus as the optimate tradition presents it — as a martyrdom. But might it not have seemed to Italian *negotiatores*, officers and soldiers to be striking confirmation of their jealous suspicions of the Roman Senate's regime in Asia? The ripples created by political struggles in Rome may well have disturbed unexpectedly wide reaches of Italy. Why should Italians remain unmoved at the prospect of senators lining their pockets with the ill-gotten gains of diplomacy instead of taking firmer action which would widen the chances of loot for thousands? Why should Italian *negotiatores* with money invested in Asia be any less agitated than their Roman confrères if persuaded that senatorial bungling was endangering the health of "la vache à lait" and that forays by unruly clients into Paphlagonia and Cappadocia were going unchecked because of corruption? Presumably the reforms of Scaevola and Rutilius Rufus hit Italian financiers as hard as Roman, and did nothing to endear the Roman *nobiles* to them, either.[35]

The attack in the courts on the senior statesman Scaurus was the culmination of the campaign to discredit senatorial management of Asia. Coming at a time when a major eastern war, expected to yield easy loot on a vast scale, was thought to be looming, this shocking event must have contributed to the discontent which boiled over in 91 B.C. To meet this desperate situation, the master plan for 91 B.C. called for restoration of the support of the *plebs*, using Crassus once again for a repeat of the short-lived victory of 106 B.C. Once the wedge had been driven between *plebs* and Equites by Gracchan-style largesse, the bold move to end use of the extortion court for political show trials would be feasible. Marius could also be forestalled, and the alienated *socii* be profitably mollified by some extension of civic rights.[36]

Before his year was out, Drusus had fallen μέγαζ μεγαλωστί and the Social War was beginning. A post mortem on a martyr seems an indelicate operation to perform, and Drusus should be allowed to retain his crown as a gallant champion of the Senate's authority. But we need not go to the extreme of claiming him as a selfless champion of the Italian cause betrayed by lesser minds. The prize of the political lists which he entered was very great and very real — the power to shape Rome's presence in the East. The pull of the East continued to make itself felt in the tides of Roman politics long after his death. Pompey was to intrigue for his Eastern command as determinedly as Marius and win it by a manoeuvre strikingly similar to that of 108 B.C. How the Equites would tremble as Cicero thundered on (*De Imp. Pomp.* 5.12) about the expulsion of Ariobarzanes and the dire threat of the two enemy kings looming over Asia! After Pompey's eastern successes the wealth of Asia was massively injected into the politics of the capital and its resources squandered in support of three successive lost causes.[37] Perhaps Augustus was the first Roman to appreciate the

fact that the treasure chest of the East was not bottomless. At least he was the first to take a methodical and thorough inventory. But the Greek East had to wait for Hadrian and an end to dreams of boundless conquest before it could be integrated finally and constructively into Rome's designs.[38]

## NOTES

*An earlier version of this paper was read at a seminar sponsored by the Classics Department of Harvard University in March, 1976.

[1]E. Badian, "From the Gracchi to Sulla," *Historia*, vol. 11 (1962), pp. 197-245, esp. p. 220.

[2]J. Carcopino, *Histoire romaine*, vol. 2 (1940), pp. 359-360; H. Last, *Cambridge Ancient History*, vol. 9 (1932), pp. 182, 184. Dubious speculation about Drusus' personality, based on the later sources, reappears in E.S. Gruen, "The *Lex Varia*," *Journal of Roman Studies,* vol. 55 (1965), pp. 59-73, esp. p. 61; also, *Roman Politics and the Criminal Courts* (Cambridge Mass., 1968), pp. 207, 211. But Cicero, our earliest source, describes him with respect as a man of uncompromising moral earnestness ('singularis severitas,' *de Officiis* 1.30.108).

[3]See, e.g., E.J. Weinrib, "The Judiciary Law of M. Livius Drusus (tr. pl.91B.C.)," *Historia*, vol. 19 (1970), pp. 414-443, with minor criticism by A.R. Hands, "Livius Drusus and the Courts," *Phoenix*, vol. 26 (1972), pp. 268-274.

[4]See, e.g., Badian, *Historia*, vol. 11 (1962), p. 225; also, *Publicans and Sinners* (Ithaca, 1972), p. 92.

[5]Gruen, *Roman Politics*, p. 207 n. 74; A.N. Sherwin-White, *The Roman Citizenship*, (2nd edition, Oxford, 1973), p. 140. Last, *Cambridge Ancient History*, vol. 9, pp. 177-184, also follows Appian. Cf. E.T. Salmon, "The Cause of the Social War," *Phoenix*, vol. 16 (1962), pp. 107-119, esp. p. 114, for protest against the stock view of Drusus as the Italians' champion.

[6]Cf. Sherwin-White, *Roman Citizenship*, pp.42f., esp. p. 132, where he points out that Rome had by the third century B.C. already expanded to the utmost possible extent if she was to remain in any sense a city-state.

[7]J.L. Strachan-Davidson, *Problems of the Roman Criminal Law* (Oxford, 1912), vol. 2, pp. 78-79; J.P. Balsdon, "The History of the Extortion Court at Rome, 123-70 B.C." *Papers of the British School at Rome,* vol. 14 (1938), pp. 98-114, esp. p. 100. For Cicero's testimony, see A.H.J. Greenidge and A.M. Clay, *Sources for Roman History 133-70 B.C.* (2nd edition, revised E.W. Gray, Oxford, 1960), pp. 129-137.

[8]See T.R.S. Broughton, *The Magistrates of the Roman Republic* (New York, 1951-52), vol. 2, pp. 12, 14 n. 1. Tacitus, *Annals* 3.27, claims that Drusus bribed the people in the Senate's cause.

[9]See E. Badian, "Caepio and Norbanus," *Studies in Greek and Roman History* (Oxford, 1964), pp. 34-70; Gruen, "The *Lex Varia*," *J.R.S.*, vol. 55 (1965), pp. 59-73; also, *Roman Politics*, pp. 203f. For the wealth of the Metellan *factio*, see P.A. Brunt, "Two Great Roman Landowners," *Latomus*, vol. 34 (1975), pp. 619-635, esp. p. 630f.

[10]Sources in Greenidge and Clay, *Sources for Roman History*, pp. 128f. Cf. H.C. Boren, "Livius Drusus, tr. pl. 122B.C., and his anti-Gracchan Program," *Classical Journal,* vol. 52 (1956), pp. 27-36.

[11]Broughton, *M.R.R.*, vol. 1, pp. 541, 546, 571-572; E. Badian, *Foreign Clientelae* (Oxford, 1958), pp. 192-225; Gruen, *Roman Politics*, pp. 136-167.

[12]Broughton, *M.R.R.*, vol. 1, p. 565 n. 4; Gruen, *Roman Politics*, pp. 167f.

[13]Cf. Badian, "From the Gracchi to Sulla," *Historia*, vol. 11 (1962), pp. 197-245, esp. p. 215, also, *Foreign Clientelae*, pp. 192f.; Gruen, *Roman Politics*, p. 143.

[14]See L.R. Taylor, "Forerunners of the Gracchi," *J.R.S.*, vol. 52 (1962), pp. 19-27; E.S. Gruen, *The Last Generation of the Roman Republic* (Berkeley, 1974), p. 427.

[15]Tacitus, *Agricola* 6.2; Th. Reinach, *Mithridate Eupator, Roi de Pont* (Paris, 1890), p. 83. For the wealth of Asia and its political impact, see also D. Magie, *Roman Rule in Asia Minor* (Princeton, 1950), vol. 1, pp. 34f.; E. Badian, *Roman Imperialism in the Late Republic* (2nd edition, Oxford, 1968), pp. 47-48; A.J. Marshall, "Flaccus and the Jews of Asia," *Phoenix*, vol. 29 (1975), pp. 139-154, at 151f. Cf. T.P. Wiseman, "Senators, Commerce and Empire," *Liverpool Classical Monthly*, vol. 1, no. 1 (1976), pp. 21-22.

[16]Appian, *Civil Wars* 1.22.2. Cf. Badian, *Foreign Clientelae*, pp. 173-174.

[17]See J.P. Balsdon, "Roman History, 65-50B.C.: Five Problems," *J.R.S.*, vol. 52 (1962), pp. 134-141, at 135f.; Badian, *Publicans and Sinners*, pp. 99-101.

[18]For the Roman armies in the field at this date, see P.A. Brunt, *Italian Manpower 225 B.C. - A.D. 14* (Oxford, 1971), pp. 435-440.

[19]Broughton, *M.R.R.*, vol. 1, pp. 569, 570 note 4.

[20]Brunt, *Italian Manpower*, pp. 431-434. See also Magie, *Roman Rule*, pp. 194f., 204f.; H. Hill, *The Roman Middle Class* (Oxford, 1952), p. 129; Badian, *Roman Imperialism*, pp. 31-33.

[21]See Badian, "Q. Mucius Scaevola and the Province of Asia," *Athenaeum*, vol. 34 (1956), pp. 104-123, at 117f., also, "Sulla's Cilician Command," *Athenaeum*, vol. 37 (1959), pp. 279-303.

[22]See Badian, *Athenaeum*, vol. 34 (1956), p. 119; Gruen, *Roman Politics*, p.206; Weinrib, *Historia*, vol.19 (1970), p.434.

[23]Badian, *Athenaeum*, vol. 34 (1956), pp. 104-123, also, *Foreign Clientelae*, pp. 214-215; Magie, *Roman Rule*, p. 173.

[24]Badian, *Athenaeum* loc. cit., pp. 110 note 5, 117, also, "Caepio and Norbanus," *Studies in Greek and Roman History*, p. 39, also, *Foreign Clientelae*, p. 210.

[25]Cf. Badian, *Roman Imperialism*, pp. 31-32; E. Olshausen, "Mithradates VI. und Rom," *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt*, vol. 1, part 1 (Berlin and New York, 1972), pp. 806-815.

[26]Appian, *Civil Wars* 1.55.2 (of the war in prospect in 88B.C.). For the vast loot actually realized after the defeat of the Pontic king, see T. Frank, *An Economic Survey of Ancient Rome*, vol. 1 (Baltimore, 1933), pp. 296f., 324f.

[27]See M. Rostovtzeff, *Cambridge Ancient History*, vol. 9, pp. 211-238; Magie, *Roman Rule*, pp. 195f.

[28]See Magie, *Roman Rule*, p. 204, 208f.; Badian, *Athenaeum*, vol. 34 (1956), p. 111, also, *Studies in Greek and Roman History*, pp. 46, 58.

[29]Cf. Ch. Wirszubski, *Libertas as a Political Idea at Rome during the Late Republic and Early Principate* (Cambridge, 1950), pp. 1-70.

[30]Pliny, *Letters* 4.13.3; Tacitus, *Histories* 3.57, 'municipalem aemulationem.'

[31]E.A. Sydenham, *The Coinage of the Roman Republic* (London, 1952), nos. 617-624, 634. See further E.T. Salmon, "The Cause of the Social War," *Phoenix*, vol. 16 (1962), pp. 107-119, at 118f. The attempt of P.A. Brunt in "Italian Aims at the Time of the Social War," *J.R.S.*, vol. 55 (1965), pp. 90-109, to narrow the Italians' objective down to simply the right to vote at Rome has not met with general acceptance. See Sherwin-White, *Roman Citizenship*, pp. 134-149, esp. p. 143.

[32]E. Gabba, "Le origini della Guerra Sociale e la vita politica romana dopo l'89 a.C.," *Athenaeum*, vol. 32 (1954), p. 41-114, 293-345 (also published as an extract, Pavia, 1954). For criticism of his thesis, see, e.g., S.I. Oost, *Classical Philology*, vol. 49 (1954), pp. 274-275; J.P. Balsdon, *Gnomon*, vol. 26 (1954), pp. 343-344; Brunt, *J.R.S.*, vol. 55 (1965), p. 104; Sherwin-White, *J.R.S.*, loc. cit., pp. 168-170. For the Sabellian component of the Confederacy; see also E.T. Salmon, "Notes on the Social War," *Transactions of the American Philological Association*, vol. 89 (1958), pp. 159-184, esp. pp. 166-169.

[33]For the Italian traders in the eastern provinces, see J. Hatzfeld, *Les Trafiquants italiens dans l'Orient hellénique* (Paris, 1919); A.J.N. Wilson, *Emigration from Italy in the Republican Age of Rome* (Manchester, 1966), pp. 152f.; Badian, *Foreign Clientelae,* pp. 152-153.

[34]Reasonably conjectured by Badian, *Historia,* vol.11 (1962), p. 217. For the allied troops' share of booty, see Badian, *Foreign Clientelae,* pp.150-151. For their obligation to provide their own pay and rations, see Brunt, *J.R.S.,* 55 (1965), p.102. Sherwin-White, *Roman Citizenship,* p.143, and Salmon, *Phoenix,* vol.16, (1962), pp.118-119, maintain that Rome treated Italian contingents as cannon fodder and assigned the brunt of the fighting to them. Such irritants surely increased the Italian allies' desire for an equal say in the government of the Empire which they had done so much to conquer and defend. See the sources quoted in Greenidge and Clay, *Sources for Roman History,* pp. 138-139.

[35]See Badian, "Sulla's Cilician Command," *Athenaeum,* vol. 37 (1959), pp. 279-303, also above, note 20. For the influence on events of the Italian traders, see Salmon, *Phoenix,* vol. 16 (1962), pp. 108-109.

[36]For the political significance of the popularity and rhetorical powers of L. Licinius Crassus, see Badian, *Studies in Greek and Roman History,* p. 43, also, "Quaestiones Variae," *Historia,* vol. 18 (1969), pp. 447-491, at 467.

[37]See M. Rostovtzeff, *The Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic World* (Oxford, 1941), vol. 2, pp. 989f.; Badian, *Roman Imperialism,* pp. 76f.

[38]Cf. Magie, *Roman Rule,* pp. 611-629; A.H.M. Jones, *The Cities of the Eastern Roman Provinces* (2nd edition, Oxford, 1971), pp. 503-508; J.C. Mann, "The Frontiers of the Principate," *Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt,* vol. 2, part 1 (Berlin and New York, 1974), pp. 508-533.